I. INTRODUCTION

C
ORE and metro networks are evolving to support ultrahigh rate communication systems enabling elastic adaptation and optimization of transmission parameters while guaranteeing high reliability [2] . In the recent years, optical networking has experienced important advances both at the physical and the control layers. Emerging data plane technologies are going to support the increasing traffic demand with transponders enabling high bit rates such as 1 Tb/s, possibly looking at downscaling power consumption and costs per bit, and offering high spectral efficiency, thus increasing network life [3] - [7] . At the control plane layer, software define networking is emerging as an architecture to remotely set network devices, thus programming transmission characteristics (such as offered bit rate) and switching [8] - [12] . However, while data and control planes have experienced such advances, the innovations in the management plane have not followed these trends yet [13] , leaving management as complex and decoupled at the IP and the optical layers.
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Network management includes the operation, administration, maintenance (OAM) functions required to monitor and interpret the measurements on services and devices, and to recover from faults or degradations [13] . Because of such problematics, recently, the application-based network operations (ABNO) architecture [14] has been proposed within the IETF as a solution integrating control and management functionalities and orchestrating both applications and service provisioning at the client layer. Such architecture may have the prospects to offer to the operators an agreed way to properly control and manage networks and applications. ABNO includes the OAM Handler, a key functional block to verify the actual quality of transmission (QoT) at the data plane layer and the service level according to specific agreements (SLAs) at the application layer. The OAM Handler is responsible for: 1) receiving alerts about potential problems; 2) correlating them (e.g., for fault localization); 3) triggering other components of the ABNO, such as the path computation element (PCE), to take actions to preserve the services that are interested by the fault or the degradation. In such a scenario, monitoring techniques are also fundamental. Again, the data plane layer offers new ways of monitoring. Current coherent systems permit direct monitoring of the optical connections through the digital signal processing into the receiver itself [2] . If needed, the OAM Handler has to trigger proper actions (e.g., adaptation of transmission parameters, re-routing) to react against soft or hard failures (e.g., link degradations or faults, respectively) which degrade QoT and, in turn, service level. While some functionalities of the ABNO architecture have been studied in the literature [15] - [19] , the OAM Handler still requires to be deeply investigated, also considering scalability issues, e.g., given that the amount of alarms generated by an optical network may be huge. Moreover, alarms in next generation optical networks may also become much more frequent because of system margin reduction. Indeed, vendors and operators are now oriented to reduce system margins that account for aging, model inaccuracies, cross-phase modulation and other degradations [20] - [22] . Such margins cause the underestimation of the optical reach, thus, increases the number of regenerators in a network and in turns the costs. A reduction of system margins can decrease the number of installed regenerator, but, on the other hand, a more frequent generation of alarms may occur. Indeed, as described in [22] , more conservative thresholds should be adopted to trigger alarm generation and, in this case, the number of alarms can become even much more higher than in current networks.
In this paper, we present the hierarchical monitoring architecture proposed within the framework of the EU project ORCHES-TRA, by expanding the work of [1] . The monitoring infrastructure consists of virtual monitoring entities and agents with the OAM Handler at the root of the hierarchical infrastructure. Possible actions taken by the monitoring plane and by ABNO are summarized depending on the type of failure. The scalability of such architecture is evaluated. To this purpose, first, measurements are carried out on a commercial system to recognize the amount and the type of generated alarms upon link degradation. Then, such measurements are used as input in the simulations, showing the improved scalability achieved by the proposed hierarchical architecture with respect to a centralized OAM Handler. Moreover, reactions to soft-or hard-failures are summarized considering new emerging technologies at the data plane.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the ABNO architecture proposed within IETF and related research works. Section III introduces the proposed hierarchical monitoring architecture and OAM Handler. Section IV summarizes possible actions and workflow taken by the monitoring plane and ABNO, depending on the fault and on the affected service. Section V presents a study on the scalability of the proposed architecture. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. ABNO ARCHITECTURE AND RELATED WORK
The ABNO architecture is composed of a set of functional modules enabling the control and the management of applications and network. It provides on-demand and applicationspecific reservation of network connectivity, reliability, resources, and management for several network applications [14] . Fig. 1 describes the ABNO architecture considering the main modules relevant for this study. For a complete ABNO architecture, the reader can refer to [14] .
Hereafter, the main ABNO functional modules are described:
1) The network management system (NMS) in ABNO may be considered as an entity that issues service requests to the ABNO Controller. 2) Application Service Coordinator can be the alternative to NMS for requesting services on behalf of applications, such as a program on a host or server, a tool requiring end-to-end connection, or a virtual private network.
3) The databases (DBs) considered in the ABNO architecture are the traffic engineering DB (TED) storing traffic engineering information (such as the range of spectrum occupied per link) and the label switched path DB (LSP-DB) containing information on the state of LSPs such as traversed interfaces, bit-rate, occupied frequency slot [23] . Besides these two DBs included by the IETF RFC 7491 [14] , we also consider a DB storing physical layer (PL) information, named PL-DB. Such DB stores all the accessible information related to the PL, which are known from the devices' data sheets or accessible through monitoring. PL-DB entry may refer to an LSP or to a network device like a fiber. PL-DB may include bit error rate (BER) of lightapaths, amplifiers' information (e.g., noise figure), fiber information (e.g., attenuation, chromatic dispersion, average differential group delay, and effective area), and so on. 4) The ABNO controller coordinates control and management functions in ABNO. The ABNO Controller governs the behavior of the network based on network conditions and application requirements. 5) The PCE is devoted to path computation (in some cases it also performs wavelength or spectrum assignment). The PCE may receive these requests from the ABNO Controller or from network elements themselves. The PCE performs computation based on the view of network topology stored in the TED. More advanced computations may be provided by a Stateful PCE that enhances the TED with LSP-DB or PL-DB [24] . Finally, an Active PCE allows additional active functionalities such as making provisioning requests to set up new services or to modify active services. 6) The OAM Handler is devoted to detect faults or degradations and take actions to react to problems in the network. The OAM Handler is responsible for receiving alerts from the network about potential problems, for correlating them, and for triggering other components of the system to take actions to preserve or recover the affected services. The OAM Handler interacts with monitoring and testing devices. We also assume that the OAM Handler can also ask to the monitoring system to get specific monitored physical parameters on demand. 7) The Provisioning Manager is responsible for the provision of requests, interfacing with the control plane implemented in the network or directly programming individual network devices. Regarding research activities, some works in the literature have investigated ABNO [15] - [19] . In the experiment in [15] , the ABNO controller efficiently manages two PCEs depending on the service to be accomplished: a PCE is invoked for service provisioning, while another PCE includes more complex algorithms for network re-optimization. In [16] , ABNO orchestrates end-to-end multi-layer and multi-domain provisioning, considering optical packet and circuit switching. Aguado et al. [17] demonstrate ABNO for a multilayer (IP and optical) and multivendor scenario. In [18] , multi-layer path computation, connection provisioning and topology discovery/transfer are experimentally demonstrated. Gifre et al. [19] present a testbed to assess re-optimization algorithms and ABNO workflow. OAM functionalities and architecture within ABNO still need to be deeply investigated. 
III. THE HIERARCHICAL MONITORING ARCHITECTURE AND THE OAM HANDLER
An optical network (with fixed-or flexible-grid) is considered to be equipped with monitors, that are assumed for lightpaths (LPs), links, and nodes, as in Fig. 2 . LP monitors are assumed integrated in the digital signal processing of each LP coherent receiver (e.g., pre-forward-error-correction BER-pre-FEC BER-monitors), while, as an example, power monitors can be assumed for links and nodes. The proposed hierarchical monitoring architecture is presented in Fig. 3 . Each entity provides the same OAM functions: i.e., collecting and correlating alerts and triggering actions to preserve services. Each one is responsible for a specific set of LPs or for a sub-set of nodes or links (e.g., nodes belonging to a given network area). Exchange of monitored information can be triggered due to physical layer degradations or faults and, in this case, information flows towards the upper layers. Each layer correlates and filters the received information efficiently sending less amount of monitoring information to an upper layer toward the OAM Handler. Alternatively, the OAM Handler on behalf of the ABNO controller can ask to the monitoring plane to get specific monitoring information (e.g., optical signal to noise ratio) that can be used to have a more updated PL-DB or to perform advanced path computations for new requests [25] .
The architecture of a monitoring entity (e.g., LP group1 at level 1 of Fig. 3 ) is shown in Fig. 4 . The Agent is responsible to disseminate monitoring information. Although not shown, the Manager at level i is connected to several monitoring entities The monitoring architecture is divided in three parts, one per monitored type of element: thus, it includes monitoring elements responsible for LPs, for links, and for nodes. Regarding LP monitoring architecture, the level 0 is responsible for OAM of single LPs. Similarly, regarding link and node, the level 0 is responsible for OAM of single links or nodes, respectively. Upper layers are responsible for a set of LPs (e.g., LPs starting from the same ingress node), links, or nodes. While the level in the hierarchy increases, the monitoring entities are responsible for a larger set of LPs or links and nodes, up to being able to correlate information of all LPs, links, and nodes.
As an example, by referring to Fig. 2 where four LPs are active, the level 0 has four active LP monitors. By assuming an amplifier malfunction in link A-B, several alarms will be generated for the LP connecting A-B and for LP connecting A-C. Such alarms will be sent to the upper layer for correlation. The level 1 is composed of monitoring entities, each one associated to a group of LPs. For example, each monitoring entity at the level 1 can group all the LPs starting from the same ingress node (e.g., LP group1 is responsible for LPs A-B and A-C, while LP group2 for LPs F-E and F-D). Thus, such alarms will be sent to LP group1 of the level 1 for correlation. This way, by correlating this information, a problem can be identified in the segment A-B. Then, LP level 2 can group all the LPs whose ingress node belongs to a specific region of the network and so on up to a generic level H. This scheme is applied also to link and node monitors: e.g., level 1 of link monitoring entities can correlate and filter information coming from links belonging to a specific area in the network. Once information is passed to the upper layers, the information is correlated so that failed or degraded network elements can be identified and the amount of alarms can be reduced while reaching the root of the architecture, i.e., the OAM Handler. This way, the architecture provides high scalability and the OAM Handler is not overloaded, nor the monitoring entities at each layer given that they are responsible for a limited set of network elements.
Regarding the LP part of monitoring architecture, each intermediate hierarchical level, besides collecting and correlating alarms and monitoring information, can take actions on the set of LPs for which is responsible. In case of protected LP, if the monitoring entity at a level 0 reveals an excessive BER increase, such monitoring entity can automatically trigger the switch to the protection path. Then, upper layers are informed, e.g., for fault localization, and, finally, the OAM Handler will verify that the actual service availability is satisfied according to SLA. In case of not-protected LPs, a given level will trigger the restoration. In this case, the OAM Handler will communicate to the ABNO controller the needs of dynamic re-routing, and the ABNO controller will call PCE for path computation. Finally, the Provisioning Manager will take care of the new set up for dynamic restoration. In the next section, failures and actions are discussed based on the type of service.
IV. FAILURES AND ACTIONS
Monitoring Managers of Fig. 4 are responsible to trigger alarms in case of failures or degradations, identify the affected services, and take actions to preserve the affected services. Failures are classified in two types: 1) Hard: they consist in the damage of a link or a node so that the connectivity is lost. As an example, they can be due to a fiber cut. 2) Soft: they imply a transmission performance degradation, not necessary causing a service outage. As an example, if the pre-FEC BER threshold of a transponder is 2 × 10 −3 and the soft failure only causes an increase on the BER up to 10 −3 , no outage is experienced. Instead, an outage is experienced if the pre-FEC BER passes above the threshold. A soft failure may be due to a malfunction or aging of network devices like amplifiers, equalizers, fibers and so on. It can also be due to an excessive crosstalk with other channels. Such failures may be relevant when margins against aging or crosstalk or cross-phase modulation are under dimensioned [20] , [21] . Thus, soft or hard failures impact services in a different way and it must be also considered that services may belong to different classes of traffic, thus requiring different actions for preservation. In order to provide indications on the workflow within the monitoring and the ABNO architectures, some classes of traffic are here considered: 1) Gold: protected LP 2) Silver: not protected LP and bit-rate reduction is not admitted after failure recovery (i.e., 100% bit rate recovery) 3) Bronze: not protected LP and bit-rate reduction is admitted after failure recovery (i.e., ≤ 100% bit rate recovery) A brief discussion is here provided on how a bit reduction could be experienced. A soft failure affecting a service can be overcome by switching to a more robust modulation format. This operation implies a reduction of the bit rate. As an example, with polarization multiplexing 16 quadrature amplitude modulation (PM-16QAM) at 28 Gbaud and 12% FEC, 200 Gb/s net rate is obtained; with polarization multiplexing quadrature phase shift keying (PM-QPSK) at 28 Gbaud and 12% FEC, 100 Gb/s net rate is obtained. Thus, if a reconfiguration from PM-16QAM to PM-QPSK is required, to keep the same information rate, the introduction of a new sub-carrier or the set up of a new LP must be performed. Similarly, a soft failure could be overcome by adapting the overhead (FEC) [26] , thus increasing code redundancy. Also this operation may imply a reduction of the bit rate. Indeed, if a transponder works at the maximum baud rate and code bits are increased upon soft failure, net rate decreases. Table I aims at summarizing possible actions and work flow taken once the monitoring architecture reveals an hard or a soft failure, depending on the class of traffic. In case of hard failure and protected LP (gold class), a switch to the protection path should be performed to recover the traffic. Thus, the monitoring layer identifying an affected LP triggers the switching to the protection path. Such event should be notified up to the OAM Handler to take records about possible loss of traffic taking care that SLAs are satisfied. In case of not-protected LP (silver and bronze), the monitoring plane informs the OAM Handler, which interacts with the ABNO controller. Thus, dynamic restoration can be triggered.
In case of soft failure such as amplifier multifunction, a BER increase above the pre-FEC threshold may be experienced. If the affected LP is protected, switch to the protection LP can be triggered. If the affected LP is silver class, FEC adaptation is taken into consideration, evaluating if the increase of the redundancy implies or not an increase of the ITU-T frequency slot width (i.e., the passband of traversed filters). If not, FEC adaptation is triggered by the monitoring layer identifying the affected service and then OAM Handler is notified. If the FEC adaptation implies a slot width increase, the OAM Handler has to be notified and the TED has to be consulted to check spectrum resource availability and, eventually, re-routing has to be ordered to preserve the whole traffic. In this case, the OAM Handler notifies the ABNO controller which requests the PCE to compute the recovery path. This also happens if FEC adaptation is not enough to provide transmission robustness and re-routing has to be performed. If the affected service is a bronze class, actions that imply a bit rate reduction could be taken. Thus, if FEC adaptation is expected to successfully recover from failure, this action is taken. Then, the ABNO controller will take or not actions related to the lost bit rate. Also the change to a more robust modulation format could be applied. Again, the ABNO controller will take or not actions related to the lost bit rate. If no modulation format or FEC adaptation are expected to recover from failure, the ABNO controller will trigger re-routing. Note that actions not involving the consultation of ABNO TED and LSP-DB or the invocation of PCE for re-routing-such as the switch to a protection path, modulation format adaptation, and, in many cases, FEC adaptation-are triggered by the layer detecting the failure (e.g., level 0) before notifying the upper layers in the monitoring hierarchy. Different actions can be taken if the soft failure is due to inter-channel interference (e.g., XPM). In this case, for silver and bronze classes, ABNO controller could order to shift LP in frequency, or power re-equalizzation, or rerouting. Indeed, channel interferences such as XPM typically depend on the distance in frequency of the interfering channels (the close the channels the largest the impact of XPM) and on the Soft: e.g., amplifier, equalizer, fiber aging BER increase Silver Possibilities: 1) FEC adaptation is expected to successfully recover from failure A. not implying slot width increase:
• FEC is adapted • notify the upper layer in the hierarchy B. implying slot width increase
• notify the upper layer in the hierarchy • ABNO controller orders re-routing 2) FEC adaptation is NOT expected to successfully recover from failure
• notify the upper layer in the hierarchy • ABNO controller orders re-routing Soft: e.g., amplifier, equalizer, fiber aging BER increase Bronze Possibilities: 1) FEC adaptation is expected to successfully recover from failure • FEC is adapted • notify the upper layer: if bit rate is lost ABNO could take actions on lost bit rate 2) Change of modulation format is expected to successfully recover from failure
• Change of modulation format • notify the upper layer in the hierarchy: ABNO could take action on lost bit rate 3) Change of modulation format or FEC is NOT expected to successfully recover from failure 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of the proposed hierarchical monitoring architecture is evaluated in terms of scalability. First, measurements are carried out on a commercial system to identify the generated alarms in case of link degradation. Then, such alarms are used as input for simulations in a Spanish topology composed of 30 nodes and 55 bi-directional links [27] .
A. Generated Alarms on Measurements
To identify the alarm generated upon link degradation considering commercial cards, we performed measurements on the testbed in Fig. 5 . A LP has been actived at frequency 195.30 THz. A variable optical attenuator (VOA) has been placed on the line interconnecting the two nodes and has been used to emulate link degradation. When we started attenuating the power over the optical link, the power at the receiver decreased: at −28 dBm some alarms appeared. From the receiver, eight alarms were generated due to the link loss. They were mainly related to the OTU2/ODU2/ODU0 (four alarms), while others to OCh layer(two alarms), OMS(one alarm), OTS (one alarm). From the transmitter, five alarms appeared: one for OTS layer, one for OMS and the others three were OTU2/ODU2/ODU0. Thus, a single link degradation generated 13 alarms related to a single LP. In the experiment, no hierarchical monitoring architecture has been implemented. 
B. Simulations
Simulations have considered two management architectures: 1) the proposed hierarchical monitoring architecture; 2) a centralized OAM receiving all monitoring information and correlating them. Then, two scenarios have been considered: a) link hard-failure, where all LPs traversing the failed link are disrupted and each one is source of alarms; b) soft-failure, where performance of a network element-such as an amplifier-are degraded thus causing the optical signal to noise ratio (OSNR) decrease of traversing LPs. In the latter scenario, some LPs may suffer from this degradation while others not. For that, we assumed several values of OSNR penalty due to the degradation and the model for coherent PM-QPSK in [28] . OSNR degradation may imply a BER increase over a threshold (10 −3 in the simulations) or not. If the threshold is exceeded, alarms are generated, otherwise not. Link hard-or soft-degradation is randomly generated on a single link and the generated number of alarms is counted. Results are recorded until the confidence interval of 5% at 95% confidence level is achieved. The network operates with Poisson traffic. The holding time of each connection is exponentially distributed. The hierarchical monitoring architecture consists in level 0, 1, 2, and OAM Handler. Level 0 is composed of monitors. Level 1 is composed of functional entities, each one correlating monitoring information of LPs starting from the same ingress node. Thus, at level 1, there is a monitoring entity for each network node. Level 2 is composed by a single entity which gathers all the info coming from Level 1. The root is the OAM Handler. In both centralized and hierarchical scenarios, the number of affected LPs generating the alarms is the same, but in the centralized scenario, 13 alarms per affected LP are sent to the OAM Handler (see Section A) while, in the hierarchical scenario, 13 alarms per affected LP are sent to the level 1 and each entity at level 1 is responsible for a subset of LPs (thus, providing higher scalability).
Simulations in case of hard failure are reported in Table II that shows the average number of alarms received by the OAM Handler in the centralized scenario or by each monitoring entity at each level in the hierarchical scenario. In the centralized scenario, an average of 420 alarms reaches the OAM Handler which has to process all the information, identify the degraded network element, and take actions for the LPs interested by the degradation. On the contrary, with the hierarchical architecture, 48 alarms in average are received by each monitoring entity at level 1. At level 2, around nine alarms are received, while 1 reaches the OAM Handler.
Simulations in case of soft failure are also reported. The three classes presented in Section IV are assumed. In particular, if the impacted service belongs to silver or bronze class, the ABNO controller has to invoke PCE for computation: indeed, for a silver-class service, a restoration path is computed for the whole 100 Gb/s impacted rate, while for a bronze-class service, a restoration path is computed for the half rate service (see Table I ). Fig. 6 shows the average number of received alarms by the centralized OAM or by the hierarchical levels at varying the OSNR penalty introduced by the soft failure. The number of alarms increases with the OSNR penalty since the BER of more LPs passes above the threshold (10 −3 in the simulations) thus, generating alarms. The figure shows that the hierarchical architecture is a more scalable solution with respect to the centralized OAM Handler (e.g., at level 2 of the hierarchy, the number of alarms is almost constant with the OSNR penalty). The number of alarms in the centralized solution increases much more rapidly than the ones at each levels 1 and 2. Fig. 7 shows the amount of traffic to be re-routed, for which PCE has to compute alternative paths. Such traffic belongs to silver and bronze classes. Traffic to be re-routed increases with OSNR degradation because more services are impacted by the soft failure. All impacted silver traffic is re-routed. Bronze traffic to be re-routed is lower than silver because part of impacted bronze traffic is handled with operations like modulation format adaptation. Half bronze traffic has to be re-routed, successfully completing the recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the hierarchical monitoring architecture proposed within the EU ORCHESTRA project. OAM Handler functionalities (collection, correlation, and interpretation of monitoring information, and actions for recovery) are spread into several hierarchical layers, enabling to confine sets of monitored physical parameters within specific levels in the hierarchy. This results in the limitation of the management plane overload. Measurements have been performed to identify the generated alarms in a commercial system. Results have been used to implement simulations in order to evaluate the performance of the hierarchical architecture against a centralized OAM Handler. The proposed hierarchical architecture guarantees high scalability.
